Criteria had been proposed for assessing the severity of possible test security violations for computerized tests with high-stakes outcomes. However, these criteria resulted from theoretical derivations that assumed uniformly randomized item selection. This study investigated potential damage caused by organized item theft in computerized adaptive testing (CAT) for two realistic item selection methods, maximum item information and a-stratified with content blocking, using the randomized method as a baseline for comparison. Damage caused by organized item theft was evaluated by the number of compromised items each examinee could encounter and the impact of the compromised items on examinees' ability estimates. Severity of test security violation was assessed under self-organized and organized item theft simulation scenarios. Results indicated that though item theft could cause severe damage to CAT with either item selection method, the maximum item information method was more vulnerable to the organized item theft simulation than was the a-stratified method.
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Computerized adaptive testing (CAT) is capable of administering a test to small groups of examinees at frequent adjacent time intervals, which is referred to as continuous testing. This provides examinees with flexibility when scheduling a test. For example, the computerized National Council Licensure Examination is offered to examinees on a daily basis in the United States, Canada, and many other countries (see http://www.pearsonvue.com/nclex). However, like any other continuous testing, CAT can pose test security concerns because examinees who take a test earlier may share information with examinees who will take the test later, which increases the risk that many items may become known to examinees before they actually take the test. The activities of memorizing and sharing test information among examinees can inflate test scores of examinees who have gained preknowledge of the test and hence threaten its validity.
To reduce the impact of item sharing, item exposure rates must be controlled. The exposure rate of an item is defined as the ratio between the number of times the item is administered and the total number of examinees. A closely related index to the item exposure rate is the test overlap rate, which was originally defined as the average of the percentage of items shared by a pair of examinees across all such pairs (Chen, Ankenmann, & Spray, 2003; Way, 1998) . Zhang (2002, 2003) generalized a definition of the test overlap rate from the original two examinees to a group of m examinees. They also derived the theoretical distributions for item sharing and item pooling indices. According to Chang and Zhang, some rules currently used in large-scale CAT programs are problematic. For example, Stocking's rule of thumb requires only that an item pool size be 12 times the test length (Way, 1998) . However, this results in a pool with too few items to achieve a necessary testing security control. Clearly, CAT security must be studied in a broad context, and a new emphasis should be on organized item theft.
The objective of this study was to use simulations to investigate how two different types of organized item thefts could cause damage to computerized adaptive tests (CATs). Because different CAT designs may yield different item exposure and test overlap rates, this investigation focused on two item selection methods that have been researched extensively. One is the maximum item information method (Lord, 1980) , and the other is the a-stratified method (e.g., Chang, Qian, & Ying, 2001; Chang & Ying, 1999; Yi & Chang, 2003) .
The research interest was to assess the potential damage caused by organized item theft. More specifically, for a given CAT design, how many items could be compromised by an organized item theft group? For a collection of compromised items, on average, how many of those items could future examinees encounter in their tests? Because the process of examinees taking a test can be modeled as a time series, it is interesting to explore the time effect of when thieves are sent to take tests. Would sending in thieves in the early stage of the life span of the item pool increase the severity of the damage (i.e., organized item theft) rather than sending them in just a random order (i.e., self-organized item theft)? Finally, the effect of gaining preknowledge of compromised items on examinees' score estimates was also investigated.
It can be tremendously complicated to model who are thieves in a group of examinees. As an initial investigation, a random sample was taken from a group of examinees and labeled as thieves. Those thieves were assumed to have intentionally memorized test items, and those memorized items were labeled as compromised items. Furthermore, it was assumed that an item became available to a future examinee as soon as it was compromised, it appeared in the examinee's test, and that examinee remembered the correct response to the item.
CAT Methods Investigated
One of the most commonly used item selection methods in CAT is based on maximum item information, in which items with the maximum item information at the current ability estimates are selected (Lord, 1980) . This method yields the best measurement efficiency; however, it does not include any item exposure control mechanism. Therefore, this method needs to be incorporated with an item exposure control procedure to achieve better test security management. Different methods of item exposure control have been proposed by various researchers (e.g., Chen & Lei, 2005; Davey & Parshall, 1995; Hetter & Sympson, 1997; Stocking & Lewis, 1998; Sympson & Hetter, 1985; Thomasson, 1995; van der Linden, 2003) . Among them, the Sympson-Hetter (SH) exposure control procedure (Hetter & Sympson, 1997; Sympson & Hetter, 1985) is most widely used.
The SH exposure control procedure takes a probabilistic approach to limit the maximum rate at which an item is administered to examinees. This procedure needs to be incorporated into a CAT item selection method to control the frequency with which selected items are administered. An exposure control parameter is computed for each item in the pool through a series of simulated CATs administered to a target population. The simulated CAT is conducted by setting the initial exposure control parameter to 1.0 for all the items in the pool. Based on the item selection criteria of the CAT design, an optimal item is selected. This item is administered if a uniform random number is less than or equal to this item's exposure control parameter. Otherwise, this item is set aside and the next optimal item is identified. This procedure is repeated until an item is found and administered. The CAT simulations are repeated until the probability of item administration approaches the prespecified value of the maximum item exposure rate and the values of exposure control parameters for all items have been stabilized. The resulting exposure control parameters are used in the CAT to control the maximum rate of item administration. The SH procedure can be incorporated into different item selection methods to control the maximum observed item exposure rate at a certain level.
The maximum item information method with the SH item exposure control (MII-SH), which incorporates SH into the maximum item information selection method, is one of the most widely used item selection methods for limiting the items' exposure rates at a prespecified value (Chang & Ying, 1999) .
The primary goal of the a-stratified methods (Chang et al., 2001; Chang & Ying, 1999; Yi & Chang, 2003) is to improve the item pool usage without sacrificing measurement precision. In the a-stratified method with content blocking (STRC; Yi & Chang, 2003) , an item pool is first divided into groups based on the content specifications of the pool. Within each content group, the steps of the a-stratified with b-blocking method as described in Chang et al. (2001) are followed to obtain several strata. The resulting stratified pool has the following three characteristics: (a) the content coverage of each stratum is similar to that of the whole item pool, (b) the distribution of b-parameters in each stratum is as similar as possible to that of the item pool, and (c) the average value of a-parameters increases across strata. The test is divided into several stages, one per stratum. STRC then selects items from the corresponding strata based on the match between item difficulty and an examinee's current CAT ability estimate. Items from the stratum with low average a-values are administered in the early stages of the test and items with high average a-values are used during the later stages. The SH exposure control procedure can also be incorporated into STRC (STRC-SH) to achieve the goal of limiting the maximum observed item exposure rate at a prespecified level.
The randomized item selection method, as indicated by its name, randomly selects items from the whole item pool. It results in roughly equalized item exposure rates; thus, there is no need to incorporate SH in this method. Although the randomized method is not used in any actual CAT applications, it was included in the current study as a baseline for comparison because it offers the best test security control. and Zhang (2002) proposed to use the item sharing and item pooling indices as benchmarks to assess the severity of possible test security violations in computerized tests. For a randomly sampled examinees, let X a be the number of common items shared by these examinees. The item sharing index is defined as the expected value of X a , that is, E½X a . Let Y a be the number of items an examinee can obtain from a examinees who took the test earlier, and these items will be in the test the examinee is going to take. The expectation of Y a , E½Y a , is defined as the item pooling index.
Chang and Zhang's Theoretical Results

Chang
Because the calculation of the two indices is highly sensitive to methods used in item selection, ability estimation, and item exposure control, one must search for the most promising candidate from several possible CAT designs. Assuming the randomized item selection method, Chang and Zhang's (2002) indices can serve as a benchmark for practitioners to evaluate a particular combination of testing settings. The discrepancy between the theoretical results and the observed rates obtained from a specific CAT design can provide information about the security prospects of this design. A large difference indicates the selected design needs to be improved to reduce the observed test overlap rate, whereas a small discrepancy demonstrates little improvement is needed. Chang and Zhang (2003) further generalized the application of the item pooling index to address a specific security issue referred to as the ''at-most risk.'' For example, for a given CAT design, how many thieves are at most needed to compromise a certain proportion of the item pool? Their findings indicated that the severity of potential test security violations can be considerably lessened by moderately increasing the size of an item pool. For example, for a 1,000-item pool, if each thief can memorize 20 items, then 34 thieves at most are needed to compromise 50% of the items in the pool. However, if the item pool is 700, then only 24 thieves at most are needed. The resulting number of thieves, 34 and 24, are upper bounds. For a specific item selection method, the number of thieves needed for compromising the same percentage of an item pool might be smaller than the upper bound. Because the theoretical derivations of Chang and Zhang may not be easily generalized to a ''nonrandom'' item selection method, more research is needed to investigate the potential damage caused by organized item theft. Clearly, the findings of such a study can provide guidance to practitioners in designing CAT with better security control.
Method
Simulation studies were conducted to investigate the effects of applying different strategies in organized item theft in CAT when two item selection methods, the MII-SH and STRC-SH methods, were used. To establish a benchmark, an item selection algorithm based on purely randomized item selection was used as a baseline for comparison. The randomized item selection method equalizes item exposure rates and hence yields the best level of test security control when compared with all other item selection methods. For simplicity, the randomized item selection method was called a CAT method in this study, though in reality it is not used in a CAT design.
The item pool consisted of 480 multiple-choice items from a large-scale achievement test. There were three content areas in this test; 40% of the items were from Content Area 1 and 30% of the items were from Content Areas 2 and 3. The three-parameter logistic (3PL) item response theory (IRT) model with D = 1:7 was assumed. The BILOG computer program (Mislevy & Bock, 1982) with the default setting was used to calibrate the item parameters based on more than 3,000 examinees' item responses. The means of the calibrated a-, b-, and c-parameters were 1.056, 0.111, and 0.191, with standard deviations of 0.347, 1.060, and 0.085, respectively.
CAT Simulations
Ten thousand y values were generated from a standard normal distribution. For each simulee, a fixed-length CAT of 40 items was simulated. This test length was closely matched to what could be found in practice; for example, the CAT Graduate Management Admission Test has 37 items in quantitative and 41 in verbal sections (Graduate Management Admission Council, 2007) . A content control procedure based on a modified multinomial model (Yi & Chang, 2003) was implemented as part of the CAT methods so that for each of the three methods the simulated CAT consisted of about 40% of the items from Content Area 1 and 30% of the items from each of the other two content areas. Following the steps in Yi and Chang (2003) , the item pool was stratified into four strata for the STRC-SH method.
It is common in a CAT to select the first item to be of medium difficulty (Hambleton, Zaal, & Pieters, 1991; Hulin, Drasgow, & Parsons, 1983) , assuming there is no prior knowledge about an examinee's ability. However, this may cause items with medium difficulty to be overexposed, especially when examinees' ability is normally distributed with a mean close to the mean item difficulty for the pool. It may be desirable to give an examinee a slightly easy item as the 1st item so as to help reduce the exposure rates of middle-difficulty items. In the current study, the 1st item was randomly selected from a group of 10 optimal items at y = −1, without the content balancing constraint. More specifically, for STRC-SH, 10 items were selected from the first stratum according to the closest match between item difficulty and y = −1; for the MII-SH procedure, the 10 most informative items were selected at y = −1. However, for the randomized method, the 1st item was randomly selected from the whole item pool.
The rest of the items from the designated content areas were selected based on the item selection criteria endorsed by each of the methods. For STRC-SH, the next item was selected if the following two conditions were satisfied: (a) The item had the closest match between item difficulty and the current CAT ability estimate, and (b) a uniform random number was less than or equal to the item exposure control parameter. For MII-SH, the next item was selected if the following two conditions were met: (a) The item had the maximum information at the current CAT ability estimate, and (b) a uniform random number was less than or equal to the item exposure control parameter. For the randomized procedure, the next item was randomly selected from the whole item pool. For both the STRC-SH and MII-SH procedures, item exposure control parameters were obtained through a series of simulated tests administered to 10,000 simulees, and the maximum item exposure rate was set at 0.20. If the second condition for item selection listed previously was not met, then the next optimal item was selected and its exposure control parameter was compared to a new uniform random number.
The expected a posteriori method was used to estimate y initially, until at least one correct and one incorrect item response were obtained and five items had been administered. Afterward, maximum likelihood estimation was used.
Thieves and Compromised Items
Examinees who intentionally memorized items during the course of testing and then shared these items with other examinees who will take the test later were labeled as thieves in this study. The thieves were randomly picked from the simulees, and the items compromised by each thief were randomly selected from the items administered to the thief. As an initial study, the number of thieves was set at 30, while the number of items that a thief could memorize was 10. The time effect for when the thieves were actually taking the tests was investigated by two conditions: (a) The thieves randomly appeared in the 10,000 simulees, a condition defined as the selforganized item theft activity in which thieves randomly appeared in the life span of the item pool, and (b) they appeared in the first 1,000 simulees, a situation called the organized item theft action in which thieves appeared at the early stage of the life span of the item pool. In this simulation, a thief was first randomly selected, and then 10 items out of the 40 items administered to the thief were randomly selected as the compromised items. The item response to a compromised item from any simulee who had preknowledge of that item was assumed to be 1 (i.e., correct). This represents the worst-case scenario, where an examinee would answer a compromised item correctly regardless of ability and this item's difficulty. This assumption can change the provisionalŷ for that simulee and thus affect the subsequent item selection.
Evaluation Criteria
The 10,000 simulees took the CATs twice under two different simulation scenarios: without and with the thieves. Therefore, the first simulation was a regular CAT situation without the thieves and compromised items, whereas in the second, some simulees were selected as the thieves. Consequently, some items taken by those simulees became compromised for later simulees. The impact of compromised items on item exposure and score estimates was assessed by comparing the results from the two simulations.
For item exposure and item pool usage, the descriptive statistics of the observed item exposure rate (r) were summarized. The w 2 index, a measure used to quantify the equalization of item exposure rates, was also computed:
and r i = number of times the ith item is used
where N represents the size of an item pool, L denotes the length of a test, and M is the number of examinees. Note that L=N denotes a desirable uniform exposure rate for all items, and equation (2) represents the observed item exposure rate. The observed test overlap rate was computed as the average of the percentage of the common items shared by a random pair of examinees across all such pairs. Measurement precision is usually evaluated based on the difference between the estimated and true y value. In this study, bias and root mean square error (RMSE) were computed to evaluate the measurement precision:
and
where M is the number of simulees,ŷ m is the estimated ability of simulee m (m = 1, 2, . . . , M), and y m is the true ability of this simulee. The correlation coefficient betweenŷ m and y m ðrŷ m, ym ) was calculated when evaluating the overall measurement precision. The descriptive statistics of item exposure rates, the w 2 index and the observed test overlap rate, and measurement precision were computed under the two simulation situations: in the absence and in the presence of compromised items. The former showed the performance of each method in the simulated CAT without the interference of the thieves and compromised items, and the latter demonstrated the effect of item theft on each method's performance.
The total number of compromised items in the item pool was calculated after the 30 thieves took the test. Compromised items and their impact on examinees' score estimates are highly sensitive to the item selection method adopted in a CAT design. Test security is not an issue for items that are not administered. It is only meaningful to compare the total number of compromised items and the impact of those items by considering the effective item pool size. The effective item pool size is defined as the size of an item pool based on the number of items that are administered at least once.
The average number of compromised items that each simulee encountered was calculated. The damage caused by the compromised items was quantified as the average number of compromised items each simulee could encounter. Such damage was best evaluated by the discrepancy between estimated and true ys, that is, the bias and RMSE computed in the presence of compromised items. Recall the assumption that a simulee would answer a compromised item correctly when encountering it in the test.
Based on the derivation of Zhang and Chang (2005) , assuming a simulee takes a test at time t, X i ðtÞ represents whether the ith item administered to the simulee has been compromised; that is,
Let Pði|t) be the probability of fX i ðtÞ = 1g; that is, Pði|tÞ = ProbfX i ðtÞ = 1g. Let L be the number of items in a test; P L i = 1 X i ðtÞ is then the number of compromised items administered to a simulee at time t. The survival function, which was computed as (100 − cumulative percentage) of the simulees encountering a different number of compromised items, was also graphed. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the item parameters for the whole item pool and the four strata, respectively. The content coverage of each stratum was similar to that of the full item pool; that is, Content Area 1 provided 40% of the items and Content Areas 2 and 3 provided 30% each. As indicated in Table 1 , the distribution of b-parameters closely matched that of the whole item pool, and the average value of the a-parameters increased across the strata in the stratified pool. Figure 1 presents the test information functions of the total item pool and each of the four strata based on the number of items in the pool and each stratum. It shows that the test information functions peaked in the middle of the ability scale and were relatively normally distributed. Table 2 contains the descriptive information for observed item exposure rates in the absence and in the presence of the compromised items based on the effective item pool and the total item pool sizes across the methods. When there were no compromised items, all 480 items were administered at least once with both the STRC-SH and randomized methods; therefore, the descriptive information on observed item exposure rates was the same based on either the effective or total item pool. For MII-SH, 332 items (69%) were used at least once. Based on the effective item pool, MII-SH had a larger mean (.121) and standard deviation (.081) than those of STRC-SH (.083, .044), and the randomized method had the best item exposure rate (.083, .004). The minimum item exposure rate was .000 for MII-SH, .018 for STRC-SH, and .074 for the randomized method, whereas the maximum item exposure rate was .209 (MII-SH), .214 (STRC-SH), and .105 (randomized). The randomized method yielded the smallest standard deviation (.004), whereas MII-SH had the largest (.081). When the descriptive information on observed item exposure rates was computed based on the total item pool for the MII-SH method, the mean changed to .083, while the standard deviation and the minimum and maximum item exposure rates were about the same as their corresponding values computed based only on the effective item pool. The resulting descriptive information on observed item exposure rate showed little difference in the absence and in the presence of the compromised items. Table 3 shows the w 2 index values and observed test overlap rate in the absence and in the presence of the compromised items across the methods. MII-SH resulted in a larger w 2 and a larger observed test overlap rate than those of STRC-SH when there were no compromised items. It is not surprising to note that the compromised items could affect the item pool usage for the STRC-SH and MII-SH methods. The impact of the compromised items on the item pool usage was larger when the compromised items were obtained from organized item theft (i.e., thieves came from the first 1,000 simulees). The randomized method, on the other hand, showed little difference in the item pool usage in the absence and in the presence of the compromised items, and it had the best item pool usage with a smaller w 2 and test overlap rate. It is not unusual to obtain such a result because of the item selection algorithm that was incorporated in the randomized item selection method. Table 4 illustrates the total number of compromised items along with the descriptive statistics of the a-and b-parameters and item exposure rates of these items under each condition. Table 4 also shows the proportion of the item pool the compromised items comprised for each method based on two conditions. One is the proportion of compromised items calculated based on the effective item pool size, and the other is the proportion based on the total pool size. Although MII-SH yielded the smallest number of compromised items and the randomized method generated the largest number, this did not mean MII-SH was the most secure method. Because items that were never selected by the CAT item-selection algorithm would not cause any security problems, a meaningful index should be the ratio between the total number of compromised items divided by the effective pool size, instead of the original pool size. The three methods resulted in the different patterns in the proportion of compromised items based on the effective item pool size, and STRC-SH had the best proportion. The average values of the a-parameters of the compromised items were all above 1 for the three methods, whereas the average values of the b-parameters were below 0 for the STRC-SH and MII-SH methods and above 0 for the randomized method. The average item exposure rate of the compromised items for the STRC-SH method was smaller than for MII-SH, while the randomized procedure had the smallest. Table 5 contains the average number of compromised items encountered by simulees under each condition. MII-SH resulted in a higher average number of compromised items than that of STRC-SH, whereas the randomized method had the smallest average number. The difference between the average number of compromised items resulting from the randomized and STRC-SH methods was about 2, and this difference could be as high as 8 between STRC-SH and MII-SH. The average number of compromised items that examinees encountered could be as high as about 28 Note. STRC-SH = a-stratified method with content blocking and Sympson-Hetter item exposure control; MII-SH = maximum item information method with Sympson-Hetter item exposure control. a. Proportion of item pool was computed based on the number of items that were administered at least once (effective item pool). b. Proportion of item pool was computed based on the total number of items in the item pool (total item pool).
Results
with the MII-SH method under the condition that all the 30 thieves came from the organized item theft. However, this number changed to about 21 if the 30 thieves randomly appeared among the 10,000 examinees (i.e., self-organized item theft). Even under the randomized method, an examinee could encounter as many as 19 compromised items from the organized item theft, and this number was 13 when there was self-organized item theft. Before investigating the potential impact of the compromised items on simulees' y estimates, the percentage of the compromised items falling into different ranges according to the values of the b-parameters was computed. As shown in Table 6 , the b-value distributions of the compromised items from the two conditions (i.e., self-organized and organized item theft) were similar. About 60% of the items from the STRC-SH method fell into the difficulty range of −1.0 to 1.0. Less than 1% of the items had a difficulty value in the range of 2.0 to 3.0. More than 60% of the items had difficulty values of −1.0 to 1.0 for the MII-SH method, and none of the items had difficulty values of 2.0 to 3.0. Table 7 presents the measurement precision for the CAT methods in the absence and in the presence of the compromised items. MII-SH resulted in slightly better RMSE (.226) than that of STRC-SH (.250) when there were no compromised items. The randomized method had the worst bias and RMSE (−.023, .422). In the presence of the compromised items, simulees' y estimates Note. STRC-SH = a-stratified method with content blocking and Sympson-Hetter item exposure control; MII-SH = maximum item information method with Sympson-Hetter item exposure control. Note. STRC-SH = a-stratified method with content blocking and Sympson-Hetter item exposure control; MII-SH = maximum item information method with Sympson-Hetter item exposure control.
were affected with positive bias. Note that in this simulation design when a later simulee encountered a compromised item, the item's response was changed from 0 to 1 for this particular simulee. All three methods resulted in larger bias and RMSE than those obtained in the absence of compromised items. The correlation between the true and estimated y was .928 for the randomized method, .971 for STRC-SH, and .976 for MII-SH. Although the difference between .928 and .976 seems small, the Spearman-Brown formula used to compute the test length increase for changing the correlation from .928 to .976 showed that the test length needed to be increased 3.156 times the current length. The correlation between the true and estimated y was reduced when there were compromised items. The impact of the compromised items on simulees' ability estimates was larger when the compromised items were obtained from the organized item theft, and the MII-SH method was affected more by the presence of compromised items. Table 8 contains the descriptive statistics for the difference betweenŷ and y conditional on simulees' y in the presence of the compromised items across methods. Only simulees who had encountered compromised items were included in this analysis. Simulees were divided into five homogenous groups based on their y so that about 20% of the simulees were in each group with a similar y. Table 8 shows that low-y simulees benefited more from gaining preknowledge of the compromised items, and on average simulees' y would be overestimated in the presence of the compromised items. The impact of the compromised items on simulees' ability estimate was larger when the item theft was organized. MII-SH was affected more by item theft, as reflected by the larger mean and smaller standard deviation of the difference betweenŷ and y than those of STRC-SH. Figure 2 displays the survival function (at a given number) of the percentage of simulees whose tests had at least that number of the compromised items under different simulation conditions. Clearly, this function is monotone decreasing. The faster the function decreases, the better the CAT design is. This function was affected by the type of item theft (e.g., self-organized or organized) and the CAT designs. The damage was more severe if the item theft was organized. Among the three methods examined in this study, the MII-SH method was affected the most by the simulated item theft activities. For example, there were more than 40% of simulees whose tests had at least 30 compromised items if the MII-SH method was used under the organized item theft condition, whereas the corresponding percentage was only about 7% with the self-organized item theft. When the STRC-SH method was used, this percentage was about 7% where later simulees' tests had at least 30 compromised items if the compromised items were gathered through organized item theft, and the corresponding percentage was 0.19% for the self-organized item theft. 
Discussion
Organized item theft can cause serious damage to a large-scale CAT program that has highstakes outcomes. Chang and Zhang (2002) initiated a theoretical investigation for examining the severity of possible test security violations of organized item theft in large-scale computerized testing. The indices derived by Chang and Zhang can serve as the lower bounds for test overlap rates. The theoretical results may help practitioners to design more secure computerized tests. A test security panel may evaluate the discrepancy between the theoretical lower bound and the observed test overlap rate generated by the item selection algorithm under investigation. A large discrepancy indicates that the algorithm needs to be further improved by lowering the observed test overlap rate, and a small difference shows that the item selection algorithm generates satisfactory results.
According to Chang and Zhang (2003) , the damage caused by organized item theft can be lessened by moderately increasing item pool size and selecting items more evenly. The most secure item selection method should be the randomized approach. In practice, however, the randomized item selection procedure is never used in actual CAT applications due to its poor measurement precision. The goal of the current research was to assess the severity caused by organized item theft using two realistic CAT designs, with the randomized item selection method as a baseline for comparison. The results of the simulation study indicated that the degree of damage was related to the time when the item theft took place. If the item theft happened in an organized fashion, that is, if thieves took the tests earlier in the life span of the item pool, the damage was more severe than when the item theft happened in a self-organized manner in which thieves randomly appeared among all the examinees. The result was the same for all three item selection methods. Zhang (2002, 2003) proposed to use the expected number of compromised items in an item pool as a vital test security index under the assumption that every item in the pool has equal possibility of being administered. However, this study's simulation results revealed that although the total number of compromised items resulting from MII-SH was smaller than the numbers from either STRC-SH or the randomized methods, the test security risk posed by using MII-SH was larger. For MII-SH, the number of compromised items each examinee encountered was higher than that with STRC-SH and the randomized methods. The reason is that the number of unadministered items resulting from MII-SH was larger than in either STRC-SH or the randomized methods, which made the actual effective item pool size for MII-SH much smaller. MII-SH yielded the highest observed average test overlap rate, and the likelihood that a simulee would encounter compromised items was higher, which explains why in the simulation results simulees could come across more compromised items. The STRC-SH method, on the other hand, resulted in much better test security control because it had a better item pool usage and smaller test overlap rate. Clearly, the potential damage caused by organized item theft was less severe with STRC-SH.
The effective size of an item pool has played an essential role in this investigation. It is well known that maximum information-based item selection methods tend to select the optimal items more often and typically a large proportion of an item pool remains unused (Chang & Ying, 1999 ). In the current study, the MII-SH method used 69% of the items and the remaining 31% were never administered; thus, the usable pool size turned out to be 332 rather than 480 items when there were no compromised items. Consequently, the observed average test overlap rate was much higher for MII-SH than for STRC-SH (17.493% vs. 10.589%).
With the smallest test overlap rate, the randomized method can be considered to have the best test security control. However, STRC-SH performed similarly to the randomized method in terms of test security. As for measurement precision, the performance of STRC-SH was very close to MII-SH. Therefore, the overall performance of STRC-SH can be considered the best of the three methods used in the current simulation.
Finally, the current study was an initial attempt to investigate the damage caused by organized item theft in CAT based on two CAT item selection methods. The results clearly indicated that an item selection method used in an operational CAT could and should be evaluated by this kind of simulation study. A test security panel can evaluate the observed severity indices generated by the item selection algorithm under investigation. This study was based on only two CAT item selection methods, and more studies along this line are needed. The item pool used in this study had limited characteristics (e.g., the values of the b-parameters were relatively normally distributed), and the simulated ability distribution was also normal. In future studies, different ability (e.g., skewed) or b-parameter (e.g., uniform) distributions should be considered. More issues should also be examined: for example, the effects of item pool size as well as item pool characteristics on the test security controls; the influence of thieves' memory capacities; the effectiveness of using a multiple item pool approach; and the development of different thievery models, such as basing the efforts thieves may be spending on stealing items according to the stakes of an exam. In addition, all these test security issues can be evaluated conditionally with respect to examinees' ability.
